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ABSTRACT
Committees linking national administrations and the EU level play a crucial role at all stages
of the EU policy process. The literature tends to portray this group system as a coherent mass,
characterised by expert-oriented ‘deliberative supranationalism’, a term developed through
studies of comitology (implementation) committees. This article builds on survey data on 218
national officials in 14 Member States who have attended EU committee meetings. We show
that these groups do indeed exhibit important common features. Firstly, expert knowledge
rather than country size plays a pivotal role in the decision making process. Secondly, across
types of committee, participants evoke multiple allegiances and identities. Although loyalty to
various national institutions is most frequently expressed, a considerable proportion also has a
sense of belonging to the committees as such. However, we also demonstrate that there is
significant variation among types of committee. Council and comitology groups both display
behavioural patterns that are strongly intergovernmental in character, while Commission
committees seem more multi-faceted in this respect. Although our primary aim here is to give
a unique empirical account, our main observations are interpreted from an institutional and
organisational perspective.
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INTRODUCTION1
Committees are an essential part of the functioning of modern governance. Some committees
are official, whilst others are unofficial or even ad hoc. They play a crucial role in the daily
operation of the European Union (EU) system of governance by providing expertise in policy
development and decision-making, by linking Member-States’ governments and
administrations with the EU level as well as by increasing the acceptance of European laws
and programs in the member-states. EU committees are important arenas for EU governance
as well as melting pots of national and supranational government systems. In various guises,
committees are active at every stage of the political process within the EU machinery –
assisting the Commission in drafting legislation, preparing the dossiers on which the Council
takes decisions and supervising the implementation of EC law by the Commission. The latter
are generally referred to as comitology committees, although the term is sometimes extended
to include all committees.2
This article is the result of an extensive research project comparing domestic government
officials attending Commission expert committees (ECs), Council working parties (CWPs)
and comitology committees (CCs). For the first time, survey data that make it possible to
compare in a systematic way how the three main types of EU committees really function are
presented. One of our main observations is that sweeping generalisations on how the system
works should be avoided. Rather than dealing with committees as a coherent mass that
basically displays the same characteristics (as in Wessels’ ‘fusion thesis’3), our portrayal
mirrors a system of governance with several faces. Firstly, Council groups appear very much
as intergovernmental arenas in the sense that participants primarily seem to behave as
representatives of their home governments. Officials advocate policy positions that routinely
have been subject to coordination processes in their respective national administrations, and
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they often bring with them instructions on how to act. We think that the general availability of
interpreting facilities from all languages into other languages clearly symbolises the presence
of highly intergovernmental components in this particular context. Secondly, we unveil that
comitology committees exhibit many of the same basically intergovernmental features as the
Council working parties. This is surprising since previous research tends to portray
comitology as an arena in which participants proceed from being representatives of national
interests to becoming representatives of a Europeanised inter-administrative discourse.4
Thirdly, our findings suggest that Commission expert committees represent a setting that is
significantly different from the two former ones. Concerning expert committees, participants
usually evoke in practice a broader repertoire of roles, thus, the behavioural pattern that
follows become more multi-faceted than what characterises intergovernmental interaction.
Moreover, expert committee attendants obviously have more leeway than those on other
committees; they are not very much involved in coordination processes at the national level,
and they seldom bring with them a clear mandate on how to act. In addition, the decision
situation seems considerably more relaxed as far as language use is concerned: expert
committees have, in common with comitology committees, that interpretation is usually
available for only a few languages.
However, the picture of committee governance is more complicated than that. This article
shows that EU committees also share some important properties. First, the role of expertise is
pivotal across all types of committee. Participants assign more weight to arguments advocated
by members who have demonstrated considerable expertise on the subject matter at hand than
to views advanced by colleagues from large Member States as such. Given the huge amount
of attention devoted to the formal voting power of the various countries in the Council, this is
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an interesting result.5 Secondly, a considerable proportion of the committee members express
allegiance to the committee in which they participate, although this proportion is clearly
smaller than the proportion who express loyalty to national institutions. This observation on
multiple allegiances is important since it may contribute to diminish the controversy over
whether loyalty transfer from the national to the supranational level takes place or not. While
Wessels 6 asserts that, contrary to certain neo-functional assumptions, no such transfer has
happened, Laffan7 seems to take the opposite position. Thirdly, an overwhelming majority of
national officials across committee types expresses trust in the Commission in the sense that
they perceive Commission officials in committees to act mainly independently from particular
national interests. A clear majority in fact holds Commission officials as among their main
interlocutors during meetings. And, finally, 70 per cent say English is the language most
frequently used in informal discussions.
Although the main purpose of this article is to report what we see as important findings from
an empirical project, the observations referred above raise some crucial theoretical questions.
How are the many faces of EU committee governance to be accounted for? The
institutionalist turn in European integration studies focuses (or refocuses) on the role that
institutions play in shaping actors’ role conceptions, interests and identities.8 However, one
could argue that in order to specify the conditions under which this may actually happen one
has to ‘unpack’ institutions (if we are dealing with ‘concrete’ institutions) to see how they are
organised.9 Thus, the marked difference between Council and comitology committees on the
one hand, and Commission groups on the other, may be explained by the different
organisational structures that we find in the two settings. The basically territorially arranged
Council and comitology setting (in the sense that it builds on the representation of national
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governments as such) imposes other role expectations on participants than the sectorally and
functionally organised Commission.
Although the Council is basically structured according to territory, it is at the same time
sectorally and functionally arranged at the ministerial and working party levels. We find a
similar ‘dual structure’ in comitology committees. The organisational embodiment of
‘functionality’ across committee types may help explain the crucial role that expertise seems
to play in all committee decision making. The sectoral or functional affiliation that
participants have in common across nationality provides a shared frame of reference and a
fertile ground for policy making based on expert arguments. Finally, since EU committees
represent rather secondary organisational affiliations for most national officials (who use most
of their time and energy in national institutions), it is no wonder that ‘supranational’
allegiances are only partly expressed. However, quite understandable from an organisational
perspective, these allegiances do complement national loyalties.
The article proceeds in five main steps. The first section describes and discusses the data and
the methodology underpinning the study. The second section reports on the time requirements
and the availability of documentation for domestic officials who attend EU committees. The
third section reports the interpretation facilities available for the committee participants and
the languages actually used by them. The fourth section reveals the loyalties and identities
adopted by domestic EU committee participants, and the fifth section shows how these
officials are co-ordinated domestically.
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DATA AND METHOD
Since 1995 the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in Maastricht has
organised seminars for member-state officials on the role of committees in the EU political
process. In the spring of 1997 we started to distribute a questionnaire10 to those participants in
the seminars who had been involved in one or several committees at the EU level. The
questionnaire was designed to get an overview of the experience of member-state officials in
EU committees: In what kind and how many committees they were involved, how frequently
meetings were taking place, how long they lasted, what languages were used, how committee
meetings were co-ordinated, etc. The major part of the questionnaire focussed on the question
of how member-state officials viewed the roles they performed in these committees, how they
perceived the roles performed by other participants and how well they were co-ordinated and
prepared before meetings.
During the first day of the seminar, those participants who had been involved in EU
committees were asked to complete the questionnaire. By distributing the questionnaires at
the first day of the Seminar, we minimised potential influences or “noise” from the seminar as
such. Participation in the seminars in Maastricht was very unevenly distributed between
different member-states. There were very few participants from the Southern Member-States,
but regular participation from central European Member-States, the U.K. and Ireland. In
addition to the seminars in Maastricht, EIPA organised a number of “Comitology seminars”
in the member-states, particularly those that had joined the EU during the last wave of
enlargement in 1995. Unquestionably, this led to a very unbalanced sample towards the new
member-states. In order to correct this, an effort was made in early 1999 to contact the
permanent representation of all the member-states from which we had a very small number of
respondents (N), asking them to help us to get more completed questionnaires from these
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member-states. This effort was very successful in the case of Belgium and Spain, but did not
result in many additional completed questionnaires from the other member-states. The
composition of the sample, by member-state, is summarised in Table I. The Table also shows
the type of ministry the respondents came from, differentiating between the foreign ministry,
other ministries, agencies and the Member-State’s permanent representation in Brussels.
Table I about here
This sample cannot claim to be representative neither with respect to the Member-States
included, nor with respect to the type of committees Member-State officials participated in.
From the total sample, 132 respondents participated in expert committees, 134 participated in
Council working parties and 76 in comitology committees. Not unexpectedly, 61 respondents
participated in at least two types of committees and 31 in all three types. Moreover, the
officials studied here are mostly employed within ministries other than the Foreign Ministry
and in medium or lower rank positions. Moreover, our data (not presented in table I) show
that expert committee participants are mostly recruited from sectoral ministries and agencies
and less from permanent representations. Council working party participants, in contrast, are
recruited to a larger extent from permanent representations and sectoral ministries.
Like in all written questionnaires, there was a considerable number of missing items -
respondents who did not complete all of the questions, even if – as was the case in our
questionnaire – for most of the questions multiple choice answers were provided for. For this
reason the N will vary between tables in the following sections.
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TIME REQUIREMENTS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENTATION
For member-state officials, participation in EU committees means consumption of scarce
resources like time, time that will not be available for national concerns. Table II shows that
time spent on EU matters varies with the place in the hierarchy of a respondent.
Table II about here
As could be expected, the major burden of committee work is carried by head of sections,
senior advisers and advisers, the middle and lower middle level of Member-States’
administrations. Nearly two-thirds of the respondents belong to this group. These observations
are empirically supported by the studies of Egeberg11, Trondal12 and Trondal and
Veggeland.13 Surprising is the relatively large proportion (20%) who come from the Director
General or Deputy Director General level. 14 This can possibly be explained by the fact that it
is common practice that, on important issues, the top level of Member-States’ administrations
will attend committee meetings in Brussels, often accompanied by lower level officials. It
may also be taken as an indicator of the importance assigned by Member-States’
administrations to EU matters. The fact that more than 60% of this top-level group spends
almost a day or more of their weekly working time on EU matters supports this conclusion.
Moreover, Council working party participants report that they seldom attend committee
meetings alone. Most of the time officials go together with colleagues from their own ministry
or from the permanent representations.
Involvement in EU affairs may affect one’s attitude to European integration positively or
negatively. If a member-state’s civil servant spends a lot of his working time with EU matters,
he or she may, for instance, get increasingly fed up with it or conversely develop an increased
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appreciation of the importance of EU issues for Member-State administrations. The majority
of the sampled officials had positive attitudes towards European integration when they first
got involved in EU committee work. Table III shows that the majority of respondents did not
change their attitude towards European integration later.
Table III about here
Only 8% indicated that participation led to a negative view on European integration. 57% did
not change their attitude and 35% indicated that their participation led them to view European
integration from a more positive perspective. Hooghe 15 makes a parallel observation within
the ranks of Commission officials. She demonstrates that senior Commission officials are
generally more supranationally oriented than newly hired Commission officials.
There are significant differences with respect to the frequency and duration of meetings
between expert committees, Council working parties and comitology committees (see Table
IV). The vast majority of the sampled officials have attended one or two committees. Only a
very small percentage of the officials have actually attended more than two committees.
These observations might partly reflect the fact that officials at the permanent representations
in Brussels are poorly represented in our sample. Lewis16 and Trondal17 show that permanent
representatives attend considerable more Council working parties than officials coming from
the capitals. Moreover, almost half of the expert committees reported in our data meet only 1-
3 times a year while 54% of the Council working parties meet 8 or more times a year,
suggesting that involvement in Council working parties is very time consuming with frequent
meetings. Hence, Council working party participants seem to participate more intensively on
EU committees than expert committee participants. About 60% of all types of committee
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meetings last one day, half-day meetings are rare, however more than 1/3 of the expert
committees last more than 1 day. “The trend seems to move to one day meetings where
Member State representatives arrive in Brussels in the morning and leave again in the
evening”.18
Tables IV and V about here
We also found interesting differences with respect to the involvement of Member-State
officials in EU committees between small, medium and large Member-State. We classified
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Sweden as small Member-States,
Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal as medium sized Member-States, and France,
Germany, Spain and the U.K. as large ones. Table V shows, that the number of meetings
attended per year was by far the highest for officials from small member-states. This is
particularly the case for expert and comitology committees. In contrast, Council working
parties are presumably attended by senior policy officials of large member-states who do not
participate in expert and comitology committees but delegate these tasks to more ‘junior’
experts. In small member-states, as a result of the smaller size of their administrations, senior
policy officials are at the same time the member-states’ experts.
Finally, a reasonable assumption would be that documentation is a necessary condition for
policy preparation. It has been frequently reported, that documentation for committee
meetings arrives only shortly before the meetings take place.19 Table VI shows that in expert
committees and comitology committees in well over 50% of the cases, documentation is in
the hands of the participant a week or more before the meeting takes place. The situation in
Council working parties is quite different. Two thirds of the respondents reported that
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documentation arrives only a day or two before the meeting. This suggests that the pace of
work in Council is the most intense and that Member-State officials are often confronted with
documentation at the very last minute. In the case of comitology committees, 14% reported
that documentation is only available at the time of the meeting. These are probably
committees in the agricultural sector, which meet weekly or bi-weekly. These committees are
dealing largely with routine matters where preparation of the participants is not required. The
results suggest that the situation may not be as bad as it is often pictured: more than 85% of
the participants have the relevant documentation in their hands before they arrive in the
meeting room. And those attending meetings chaired by the frequently criticised Commission
(expert and comitology committees), are in fact better equipped in this respect than those in
Council groups.
Table VI about here
AVAILABILITY OF INTERPRETATION FACILITIES AND LANGUAGE USE IN
COMMITTEES.
Participating in EU committees means communication. Today there are 11 official languages.
From 1 May 2004 the number of languages will increase dramatically in the EU and the
subsequent need for translation facilities. Hence, the communication- and language problems
will increase significantly with enlargement. Communication both formally in meetings and
informally during coffee breaks, lunches and in the hallways is an essential requirement for
participating effectively in these meetings
Already today it is practically impossible to provide simultaneous translation facilities from
all official languages into all others in all committee meetings. Common practice is often to
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translate from 7, 8 or 9 languages in to 3 or 4 as Table VII shows. Participants may, with few
exceptions, speak their own language, but they have to understand French, English or
German, or perhaps Spanish or Italian in order to follow the discussions. In some cases the
committee may work in only two or three languages with simultaneous translation only
between these languages. Our respondents reported a few cases where committees worked in
only one language. Table VII also shows significant differences between the different types of
committees: In Council working parties, where communication is obviously most important
as final decisions are prepared here, full interpreting facilities were available in almost 60% of
the meetings. In Commission expert committees and comitology committees 57% and 68%
reported interpreting facilities from 7 or 9 into 3 or 4 languages. Working in only 2 or 3
languages is found most frequently in expert and comitology committees. Expert groups
sometimes work in only one language, but only in one of 20 cases. Interpretation facilities are
clearly most important in Council working parties, however already today, in 40% of all
Council working party meetings full interpretation facilities are not available. Still, Table VII
indicates the intergovernmental nature of the Council working parties compared to the expert
and comitology committees.
Table VII about here
Successful negotiations and discussions in committees do not depend solely on what happens
in the committee room, but also on what happens during coffee breaks and in discussions in
the corridors and lunchrooms and that is closely related to the capability of participants to
communicate in other languages than their own. Not surprisingly we found a relatively high
competence in foreign languages among those participating in committees (self-assessment of
respondents), particularly in English, as Table VIII shows. 90% of non-native English
CES – Working paper no. 4, 2003 15
speakers are able to communicate somehow in English, and more than 80% can speak English
good or very well. French capabilities are not as widely spread, yet there are still 150 out of
about 190 non-native French speakers in the sample who somehow can manage to get along
in French if necessary. The numbers are much lower for German. We differentiated between
Germanic, Latin and other native language groups whereby Germanic languages include
German, English, Dutch and the Scandinavian languages, except Finnish. Latin languages
include French, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian. Greek and Finnish were categorised as other
languages together with a few respondents, whose native language is not one of the
community official languages. Surprising is the fact that the English competence (“good” and
“very good”) of native speakers of Latin languages is much higher than the French
competence of native Germanic language speakers. English is clearly the most frequently
used language in Brussels and it can be expected that this will further increase with
enlargement. At least for our sample English has clearly become the first foreign language of
member-state officials participating in committee meetings, indicating a linguistic
convergence in the EU.
Table VIII and IX about here
It can be expected that this development will reinforce with enlargement since English has
become the first foreign language in all the accession countries. Table IX underscores this
impression that English has become the major language in Brussels in informal
communications between Member-State officials. French is still important, but German is
almost of no relevance. In meetings, however, Member-State officials prefer to speak their
native language, but if they do not, they are more likely to speak English than French. 20
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MEMBER-STATE OFFICIALS’ LOYALTIES AND IDENTITIES
Civil servants often evoke multiple preferences, interests, roles and identities due to their
multiple institutional embeddedness. Civil servants are multiple selves with several non-
hierarchical interests and allegiances.21 The evocation of one particular interest or identity
does not necessarily trump another. By attending different institutions at different levels of
governance officials learn to wear Janus-faces and to live with diversity and partially
conflicting interests and loyalties.22 Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace23 picture a “Continuous
tension between the home affiliation and the pull of the collective forum”. However,
particular roles, identities and modes of decision-making behaviour tend to be evoked in some
situations more than in others.24
National officials attending EU committees spend most of their time and energy in national
administrations25. Accordingly, we expect their dominant institutional allegiances and
identifications to be national when entering EU committees. However, “membership” in EU
committees imposes additional obligations on officials, although for most of a secondary
character. They are exposed to new agendas and actors, and are expected to look for common
solutions.26 According to Christiansen and Kirchner27, “committees permit national officials
to familiarise themselves with the nature of the EU’s administrative system”. However,
officials participating in Council working parties and in comitology committees may be
expected to behave more like government representatives than officials attending Commission
expert committees. The main reason for this is the basically territorial principle of
organisation underlying both Council and comitology groups. In the Commission expert
committees, on the other hand, participants are expected to behave more like independent
experts. Thus, professional allegiances and sectoral role conceptions are likely to be enacted
fairly strongly among the latter.
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Table X shows that national officials who attend different EU committees express more
allegiance towards their own national government institutions than towards the EU
committees on which they participate. Thus as expected, supranational loyalties seem to be
secondary to national allegiances. However, some officials feel considerable responsibility
towards EU level entities, particularly the Council working party participants.28 Hence, a
certain kind of ‘supranational’, or system, allegiance seems to be stronger among Council
working party officials than among expert committee and comitology committee participants.
Intergovernmentalism and ‘supranationalism’ thus seem not to conflict but to complement
each other.29 Moreover, the vast majority of the committee participants have positive attitudes
towards European integration generally and within their “own” policy/issue area particularly.
However, relatively few officials change attitudes in this regard due to committee
participation (see table III above).
Table X about here
Also as expected, those in Council working parties tend to assign more weight to their
relationship to their own government than those attending the Commission expert committees,
although the difference is not very big. A remarkably large proportion of Council working
party participants identify themselves with their own sector administration, policy arena or
professional background. This pattern is probably due to the high degree of functional
specialisation that accompanies participation in the basically intergovernmentally arranged
Council structure. Hence, national officials attending EU committees evoke a complex role
repertoire indeed.
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The respondents were further asked to indicate how they perceived the roles of their fellow
colleagues within EU committees.
Table XI about here
Table XI reveals that civil servants who attend Council working parties and comitology
committees tend to consider other colleagues mainly as government representatives.30
Commission expert committee participants, on the other hand, tend to perceive other
colleagues as having more mixed roles. Here, only a minority (i.e. 45%) find that their
counterparts behave mainly as government representatives. Thus, although role conceptions
are highly multi-faceted across types of committee (cf. Table X), actual behaviour seems to
mirror more clearly the prevalent organisational features of the various arenas.
Next, the respondents were asked to asses how much consideration they put on proposals,
statements and arguments from different actors and institutions when attending EU
committees.
Table XII about here
First, almost no major differences can be observed between officials attending different EU
committees as far as the above considerations are concerned. Second, as to the relative
priority given to the proposals, statements and arguments of other actors, one consideration
seems to be more important than others: Officials attending EU committees pay most
attention to what their colleagues and experts from their own country have to say. This
observation underscores the tendency already indicated in Tables X and XI on the primacy of
national allegiances among EU committee participants. Participants, however, also emphasise
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the points of view of colleagues from other Member-States who have demonstrated
considerably expertise on the subject matter at hand. Officials give considerably less attention
to arguments from colleagues from large Member-States as such, and colleagues from
Member-States within their own region. In support of the deliberative supranationalist
account31, the quality of the argument presented by other committee participants is considered
more important than the sheer size and geopolitical location of the member-states they
represent. Moreover, the EU Commission is also considered more important than large
Member-States and Member-States within their own region. This may be interpreted as
reflecting an element of supranational identification among the committee participants.
Finally, interest groups and firms are deemed considerably less important than colleagues
from other Member-States. By comparison, however, interest groups and firms from their
own country are considered much more important than EU level interest groups and firms.
This observation underscores the general tendency apparent in Table XII, namely that national
officials attending EU committees pay more heed to national institutions than to supranational
ones.
In sum, what we see is that arguing, not only bargaining, is a salient feature of the system. 32
Hence, the intergovernmental perspective, picturing national actors entering EU arenas with
predetermined and fixed preferences has to be slightly modified. Obviously, deliberation is
taking place among actors in which interests may be moved and reshaped on the basis of
expert knowledge.
Moreover, there is obviously also a good deal of trust in the Commission, as further
underpinned by Table XIII.
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Table XIII about here
National officials attending different EU committees seem to agree on the relative
independence of Commission officials from particular national interests. Only a very small
minority, mostly among the Council working party participants, reports that Commission
officials act more in the interest of their country of origin. Hence, there is obviously a good
deal of trust in the Commission as an independent supranational executive.
Thus, participation in EU committees tends to affect the institutional allegiances and role
perceptions of the participants. Nonetheless civil servants largely retain their national and
sectoral identities when attending EU committees. An element of supranational loyalty does,
however, supplement such pre-existing allegiances to some extent.
THE CO-ORDINATION BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBER-STATE OFFICIALS ATTENDING
EU COMMITTEES
In the last section we have demonstrated that national officials attending Commission expert
committees are probably behaving more like independent experts than when attending
Council working parties and comitology committees. In contrast, when attending Council
working parties and comitology committees, national officials perceive of themselves and
their colleagues from other Member-States more as government representatives. The different
role and identity perceptions of national government officials attending different EU
committees may partly reflect different co-ordination processes at the national level. One
difference may be expected between officials attending Commission expert committees on the
one hand, and officials participating in Council working parties and comitology committees
on the other. Officials attending expert committees are expected to be less subject to national
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co-ordination. Officials attending Council working parties and comitology committees, on the
other hand, are more likely to participate in committee meetings with clearly co-ordinated
‘positions’ from their respective national governments.33
The reasons for this difference are twofold: The formal organisation of the committees and
the voting practices within them. First, the Commission expert committees are mainly
organised according to sectoral and functional principles. The Council working parties and the
comitology committees, although sectorally and functionally specialised, have a stronger
territorial component in their organisational structures. Arguably, committees organised by
territory accompany stronger co-ordination pressure on the participants than committees
organised by sector and function. 34 Secondly, voting focuses the attention of decision-makers.
Voting also signals expectations from the principals towards the agents with respect to
representing agreed-on and often written “positions”. In contrast to comitology committees,
expert committees and Council working parties do not vote in any formal sense35. Council
working parties are, however, located more clearly in the “shadow of the vote” than
Commission expert committees.36 Whereas expert committee participants are not expected to
reach any agreements or formal decisions during most committee meetings, officials attending
the Council working groups and the comitology committees are expected to reach
compromises, majority decisions and often consensus at the end of meetings.37
Table XIV reveals different modes of policy co-ordination behaviour amongst EU committee
participants. As expected, participants in Commission expert committees seem less co-
ordinated nationally than officials participating in Council working parties and comitology
committees. Officials attending comitology committees seem to be even better co-ordinated
nationally than officials attending Council working parties, though the difference is not very
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large. By comparison, officials in Commission expert committees tend to take ‘positions’ that
are less strongly co-ordinated back home. Still, when asked whether national interests or
professional considerations are deemed vital when deciding what ‘positions’ to pursue, no
major differences are observed between officials participating in different EU committees.
Council working party participants seem, however, to pay more attention to national interests
than do expert committees and comitology committee participants.38 These differences are
marginal, however. The most significant observation is that in Commission expert
committees, participants have much more leeway to follow “their” own position than in the
Council working parties and the comitology committees.
Table XIV about here
CONCLUSIONS
The study of European integration has increasingly shifted focus from the horizontal spill-
over processes at the EU level and the ‘grand bargains’ struck between the strong EU
Member-States towards the vertical blurring of governance levels across the EU – nation-state
interface. This article has focused on one such site where government levels interact and
affect each other – the EU committees. In the first two sections we observed that many
national officials spend a considerable amount of time and energy on EU committee work. In
fact almost one third of our respondents use at least half of their working hours on
preparation, co-ordination and participation in EU committees. Council working parties are
more demanding in this respect than other EU committees. Officials from small Member-
States seem to attend meetings more frequently than their counterparts from larger countries.
This is due to the smaller size of their administrations.
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Documentation is available earlier in Commission expert committees and comitology
committees than in Council working parties where it commonly arrives only a day or two
before meetings. Only a small minority receives documentation at the time of arrival.
Interpreting facilities are more available in Council working parties than in other committees.
For example, in the Council 59% report that all languages are translated into all languages
while this holds for only 17% in other committees. English is by far the most frequently used
language in formal as well as in informal meetings.
Moreover, as could be expected given the primary institutional affiliation of national officials,
national allegiances are more clearly expressed than ‘supranational’ identities. However, a
considerable proportion also feels loyalty to the committee(s) in which they participate. A
clear majority expresses considerable trust in the Commission in the sense that they
acknowledge its independence from particular national interests. Commission officials are
among their most important interlocutors. Sheer intergovernmentalism is also transcended in
the sense that the quality of the arguments seems more important than the kind of country the
speaker originates from. The multiple roles and identities evoked by our respondents also
point beyond a pure intergovernmental logic. In all kinds of committees they identify
themselves heavily with sectoral and functional administrations and policy arenas. The
government representative role is most clearly expressed in the Council and comitology
settings. It is also in these settings that their positions and mandates are most clearly co-
ordinated and instructed back home.
Recent literature argues that EU committees are sites of vertical and horizontal fusion of
administrative systems and policy instruments.39 We have demonstrated in this study that EU
committees are indeed sites of Europeanisation of individual civil servants. We demonstrate
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that the attention, energy, contacts, linguistic practices, attitudes and loyalties of European
national civil servants are to a considerable degree directed towards Brussels. However, we
have also indicated that the re-socialising and transformative powers of the EU committees
are heavily filtered and biased by the national institutions embedding the EU committee
participants. Last, but not least, we have shown that there are indeed many faces of EU
committee governance.
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TABLES










AUSTRIA 14 3 17
BELGIUM 2 20 7 29
DENMARK 1 5 1 7
FINLAND 2 17 2 21
FRANCE 3 1 4
GERMANY 7 3 1 11
GREECE 1 1 2
IRELAND 1 2 4a
LUXEMBOURG 1 1
NETHERLANDS 2 10 1 13
PORTUGAL 5 3 1 9
SPAIN 55 5 60
SWEDEN 2 23 9 34
UNITED KINGDOM 1 4 1 6
TOTAL                        N 16 163 34 4 218a
a) One respondent did not answer the question about institutional affiliation.














15% or less 37 26 24 27
15-50% 43 44 44 44
50% or more 20 30 32 29
% 100 100 100 100
Total
N 40 27 131 198
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15% or less 15-50% 50% ormore
More in favour 24 44 34
Unchanged 67 51 54
Less in favour 9 5 12
% 100 100 100
Total
N 58 83 59
Table IV: Frequency and duration of meetings in the 3 types of committees (%)
Number of
Meetings per Year EC
a CWPa CCa
1-3 49 15 36
4-8 30 31 34
8+ 21 54 30
% 100 100 100
Total
N 132 131 76
Duration of
Meetings
1/2day 6 11 10
1 day 58 60 65
1 day+ 36 29 25
% 100 100 100
Total
N 131 126 68
a) In this and all the following tables Commission expert committees are abbreviated with EC, Council working
parties with CWP, and comitology committees with CC.
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Table V: Officials from small, medium and large member-states participating in all 3
types of committees
EC CWP CCNumber of
Meetings
per Year small medium large small Medium large small medium large
1-3 3 3 5 3 1 1 7 2 2
4-8 8 5 1 4 4 2 3 5 4
8+ 6 0 0 10 3 3 7 1 0
Total        N 17 8 6 17 8 6 17 8 6




A week before 64 20 55
A day or two before 32 70 31
At time of arrival 4 10 14
% 100 100 100
Total
N 110 132 71
Table VII: Availability of interpreting facilities in committee meetings (%)
Interpreting Facilities EC CWP CC
Translation from all into all
languages
17 59 17
From 7 to 9 languages into 3 or
4 languages
56 37 68
Only 2 or 3 languages 20 3 15
Work only in one language 5 1 0
% 100 100 100
Total
N 118 132 71
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Table VIII: English, French and German capabilities, by native language groups (%)
Native Language Groups Total
Language
Capabilities
Germanic Latin Other N %
very good and good 98 78 100 167 88
can manage 2 22 0 22 12
% 100 100 100 100
English
Total
N 86 81 22 189
very good and good 51 60 69 84 56
can manage 49 40 31 65 44
% 100 100 100 100
French
Total
N 71 65 13 149
very good and good 41 25 14 19 35
can manage 59 75 86 35 65
% 100 100 100 100
German
Total
N 39 8 7 54












Total N 210 202
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Table X: Percentage who to a great extenta feel allegiance to (identify with or feel
responsible to) the following when participating in committees
EC CWP CC
My own government 65 76 69
My own ministry, department or agency 74 81 60
The requirements of the policy arena in which I am working 58 65 58
My own professional background and expertise 60 65 60
The committee or group in which I participate 39 57 44
Total                                                                                          N 106 109 58
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (value 1), to a fairly great
extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).
Table XI: Officials’ perception of the role of colleagues from other countries when
participating in committees (%)
EC CWP CC
Mainly independent experts 33 11 6
Mixed roles 22 12 20
Mainly government representative 45 77 74
% 100 100 100
Total
N 113 122 66
Table XII: Percentage who give much considerationa to proposals, statements and
arguments from the following when participating in committees
EC CWP CC
Colleagues and experts from my own Member-State 87 84 81
Colleagues from other member-states who have demonstrated
considerably expertise on the subject matter at hand
73 70 69
Colleagues from large member-states 38 38 30
Colleagues from member-states from my own region 42 46 48
Colleagues from member-states who share a similar position 61 71 68
Representatives from the Commission 57 60 57
Interest groups and firms I know from my Member-State 26 32 44
Interest groups and firms I know or have contact with at the
European level
17 11 13
Total                                                                                          N 113 121 66
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very much consideration (value 1), fairly much
consideration (2), both/and (3), fairly little consideration (4), very little consideration (5).
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Table XIII: National officials’ perceptions of Commission officials‘ independence of
particular national interests when participating in committees (%)
EC CWP CC
Mainly independent 81 70 79
Mixed roles 13 18 16
Mainly dependent 6 12 5
% 100 100 100
Total
N 109 112 63
Table XIV: Percentage of officials who co-ordinate their “position” most of the timea
before participating in committee meetings
EC CWP CC
I have to co-ordinate with the Foreign Office or another
central co-ordinating body
20 47 43
My “position” has in fact been co-ordinated with all
relevant ministries 28 47 53
My “position” has been co-ordinated with all relevant
departments in my own ministry 38 55 59
I have clear instructions about the “position” I should take 28 35 46
I take the “position” I think is in the best interest of my
country
63 72 66
I take the “position” I think is best on the basis of my
professional expertise 43 43 34
If I have no instructions, or if the question is not important
for my country, I take the “position” I think is the best for
the member-states as a group
52 46 46
Total                                                                                           N 110 119 62
a) Value 1 on the following three-point scale: always or most of the time (value 1), about half of the time (2),
rarely or never (3).
